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Preparing for Policy Changes: 
Social Security Expectations and Pension Scheme Participation
*
 
Western governments are currently contemplating how to adapt their Pay-As-You-Go 
pension systems so that these remain financially sustainable, even with an aged population. 
To the extent that policy-makers haven't already adapted their old age social security 
schemes, an ageing population thus leads to policy uncertainty in first pillar pensions. This 
paper sheds more light on the relationship between public and private savings by analyzing 
private pension scheme participation in the presence of such policy uncertainty. To do so, I 
assess the influence of subjective policy change expectations on voluntary pension scheme 
participation in the Netherlands. I find that participation in private pension schemes is higher 
for those who assign a high probability to the dismantlement of old age social security – in 
terms of lower benefits levels but more so in terms of a higher eligibility age. In addition, 
subjectively short-lived individuals who believe an eligibility age increase to be more likely 
than a benefit level cut, participate more. This could be explained by the fact that the relative 
cost of an eligibility age increase is larger for those who expect to live shorter. Individuals 
hence do prepare themselves for anticipated policy changes in old age social security and 
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After several industrialized countries had installed old age social security
in the 1940s and 1950s, economists wondered what the e®ect of these new
institutions on private savings would be. A large literature developed that
was interested in to what extent public pension schemes crowded out private
pension savings. More than ¯fty years after most Western governments in-
troduced Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension schemes, governments no longer
discuss the adornment but rather the demolition of these systems. Particu-
larly the ageing of populations has recently put pressure on policy-makers to
cut down on the generosity of their public pension schemes, creating policy
uncertainty in ¯rst pillar pensions. Therefore, it is now relevant to investi-
gate the response of private savings to a (possible) dismantlement of old age
social security. This paper tries to answer this question focusing on poten-
tial future changes rather than on changes that are already implemented.
Do people su±ciently prepare for the policy changes in PAYG pensions that
they anticipate? In addition to discovering more about the relationship be-
tween public and private pension schemes, this paper thus also sheds light
on individuals' capacity to assess how likely policy alterations are and on
their capacity to respond accordingly. Knowing whether their citizens are
indeed capable of mitigating the negative e®ects of these policy changes is
essential for all governments, and in particular for those that are currently
deciding upon policy changes in their old age social security system.
This paper investigates whether Dutch individuals who anticipate a pol-
icy change in old age social security prepare for such a change by participat-
ing more often in voluntary pension schemes. First, a model is developed
that explains optimal savings behavior in the instance of policy uncertainty
in a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension system. Second, the empirical re-
lationship between subjective expectations regarding two di®erent policy
changes and private pension participation is examined for the Netherlands.
I ¯nd that those who are more convinced of future deteriorations are indeed
more likely to participate in a private pension fund. These ¯ndings sug-
gest that uncertainty in social security `crowds in' private pension savings.
I de¯ne crowding in here as an increase in private savings, in analogy to
crowding out which in this context refers to a decrease in private savings
due to the installment of old age social security.
In this introduction, I continue by introducing some of the relevant lit-
erature. Furthermore, I explain important features of the Dutch pension
system. Section 2 then sets out a theoretical model of optimal savings un-
der uncertainty over the future of the old age social security system. Subse-
quently, Section 3 explains the empirical strategy and includes a description
of the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes and gives some policy advice.
21.1 The crowding-in of private savings
The establishment of old age social security has triggered economists to as-
sess the e®ect of this important development on wealth accumulation. A re-
lationship between savings and social security was ¯rst empirically revealed
by Feldstein in 1974. He used aggregate time series to show that social
security wealth had halved the rate of private savings in the US. Feldstein
argued that consumers had lowered savings because they would be receiving
a certain income from PAYG-bene¯ts in retirement.
This `crowding out' e®ect of old age social security has since then been
addressed by many scholars using both macro- and micro-data sources. Re-
sults based on individual information provide weak to strong evidence of
crowding out e®ects in various industrialized countries. See Kotliko® (1979)
for the U.S., Jappelli (1995) and Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) for Italy,
Guariglia and Markose (2000) and Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) for the
U.K. and Alessie, Kapteyn and Klijn (1997), Euwals (2000) and Kapteyn,
Alessie and Lusardi (2003) for The Netherlands.
In 1974, when Feldstein published his paper, the outlook on the future
of social security was very optimistic, as the following quote indicates.
\The history of social security shows continually rising bene¯t
levels, a fact that individuals no doubt perceive when they con-
template the order of magnitude of their bene¯ts at retirement
age." (p. 911)
Since the publication of Feldstein's article, increased awareness of ageing
altered this outlook on publicly provided old age pensions in most Western
countries. An illustration of this can be found in Dominitz, Manski and
Heinz (both 2002 and 2003), who have described expected eligibility for
U.S. old age social security using data from the Survey of Economic Ex-
pectations (SEE) for 1999 to 2002. They ¯nd that a substantial number of
respondents believe that the U.S. social security system will collapse entirely
within the foreseeable future. In this paper I show that many Dutch individ-
uals are also pessimistic about the future of Dutch old age social security.
About one third of respondents in a survey on pension expectations (the
`Pensioenbarometer') assigns a probability higher than .5 to a ten percent
decrease in the level of bene¯ts within the next twenty years. Respondents
are even more convinced that the old age social security eligibility age will
change within twenty years. More than half of them assign a probability
higher than .5 to a two year increase in the eligibility age.
Taking these expectations into account, this paper investigates the
crowding in e®ect of uncertainty in social security on private savings. The
crowding in term refers to increases in private wealth because of a possible
dismantlement of the social security system in analogy to Martin Feldstein's
crowding out e®ect. To my knowledge, the e®ects of a potential degeneration
3of the social security system on wealth accumulation has not been assessed
so far.
1.2 Expectations measured in subjective probabilities
In the empirical analysis in this paper I analyze the response to expectations
by exploiting variation in the subjective probabilities individuals assign to
policy changes. The analysis of explicit subjective expectations is a popular
new ¯eld of research in economics. Manski (2004) provides an overview of
the use of subjective probabilities in modern economics. Individuals seem
surprisingly able to translate their knowledge on the idiosyncratic risk they
face into a probability that is equal to the ex-post realized probability. For
example, Hurd and McGarry (2002) ¯nd that elderly who die within two
years of participating in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) had re-
ported a much smaller probability of surviving until the age of 75 than those
who actually survived.
The predictive power of subjective survival probabilities will be exploited
in the empirical analysis of this paper. More importantly, subjective prob-
abilities concerning the future occurrence of a change in the social security
system will be the independent variables of interest.
The relationship between subjective expectations and individual savings
behavior is analyzed by authors such as Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1992)
and Stephens (2004). Guiso et al. use a subjective measure of income un-
certainty in order to quantify the size of precautionary savings and in doing
so they discover a substantial size of precautionary savings. Stephens ex-
amines whether job loss expectations a®ect savings behavior and does not
¯nd any e®ect. He argues this could be because of probability weighting in
a loss aversion context (see Bowman et al., 1999) so that individuals with
very small job loss probabilities actually over-weight these.
1.3 Old age social security in The Netherlands
The Netherlands has a hybrid pension system. All three traditional pillars
- the mandatory public pillar, the mandatory occupational pillar and the
voluntary private pillar - are of considerable importance in providing an in-
come for the elderly when compared to other countries (see Boersch-Supan,
2004 for more information). The ¯rst pillar has a Pay-As-You-Go character,
while the second and third pillar are capital funded.
Most employees are obliged to participate in the second pillar, the occu-
pational pension schemes. Annuitization of their assets is compulsory and
there is little freedom over the investment choices. The most common third
pillar pension products are the so-called `lijfrente-polissen' and `koopsom-
polissen'. Consumers can buy these annuities from banks and insurers either
through regular contributions (lijfrente) or through the deposit of a lump-
4sum (koopsom). Contributions to second and third pillar pensions schemes
are to a certain degree tax-deductible.
The old age social security arrangement in the Netherlands, the Al-
gemene Ouderdomswet (AOW), was established in 1957 to provide a base
pension for all inhabitants. Designed on Beveridge's principle, the eligibil-
ity for and level of AOW bene¯ts does not depend on contributions paid,
income or wealth, only on years of residence in the Netherlands. For each
year one has legally resided in The Netherlands between the ages of 15 and
65, one receives two percent of the maximum AOW amount from the age of
65 onwards, irrespective of retirement. The real level of AOW bene¯ts has
remained stable since 1979, at approximately seventy percent of the mini-
mum wage. The net level of a couple's combined AOW bene¯ts equals the
net minimum wage. In 2007, this came down to a gross monthly allowance
of EUR 945 for singles and EUR 648 for pensioners with a partner.1
Ageing as well as changing economic and political circumstances trig-
gered discussions on the sustainability of PAYG-pensions from the late 1970s
onwards. The historical Dutch policy debate is summarized by Van Eeke-
len (2006). Despite this debate the old age social security arrangement has
remained roughly the same as it was when introduced in 1957.
The fact that the PAYG-system is so universal, i.e. each individual in
principle receives the same bene¯ts, provides a great research environment.
The expectations individuals form over the future of the system thus all
relate to the exact same thing and are not confounded by idiosyncratic risk
factors. In contrast, the expectations regarding eligibility for U.S. social
security reported in Dominitz et al. (2003) combine expectations about
macro (such as policy uncertainty) and micro risks (such as unexpected
income shocks).
2 Theoretical model
In this section I present a simple theoretical model on how the savings be-
havior of expected utility maximizers would respond to their expectations
regarding the future of a ¯rst pillar pension system. The life-cycle model
developed here is a three-period model of consumption. All individuals live
for three periods. Individuals just face two decisions in their life; what to
save in the ¯rst period (Si) and what to consume out of these savings in the
second period (zi).
Labor supply and retirement are thus exogenous. I realize that this
1The system is ¯nanced through an earmarked payroll tax, which constitutes 17.9% on
the ¯rst EUR 30,000 of gross income. Those over 64 do not pay this tax as they are already
receiving bene¯ts. In 1997 the AOW tax rate was legally capped so that the remainder of
AOW expenditures are now ¯nanced through general taxes which are also paid by retirees
with a substantial pension income. Whereas in 2001 still all expenditures were ¯nanced
through the payroll tax, in 2006 this decreased to 70% of AOW expenditures.
5assumption is a great simpli¯cation of reality, but endogenous retirement
would not greatly change my results2. In the ¯rst period everybody is
young and working. Workers receive individual-speci¯c wages (Ii), which
are larger than one for everyone. All individuals are retired in period two
and three. I assume a standard additive model as in Browning and Lusardi
(1996) that allows for a precautionary savings motive, as I believe this pro-
vides the clearest, yet most plausible results. Lifetime utility is therefore
additive and has a logarithmic functional form.
There exists a government that pays out a ¯xed old age social security
bene¯t (P) to all citizens. The government raises both a general consump-
tion tax ¿ and an additional consumption tax µ that equals the contribution
to the old age social security system. I choose a consumption tax in order
to mirror the tax-deductible nature of pension savings. Individuals that re-
ceive a pension bene¯t do not contribute to the pension system, although
they do pay general taxes. Hence, there is a Pay-As-You-Go pension system
in place. Note that the PAYG system is not necessarily actuarially fair as
I assume there exists a ¯nancial fund that gathers the excess contributions
in certain periods and that pays the bene¯t de¯cits in other periods. For
simplicity, it is impossible to leave a bequest in the model and the market
interest rate and the discount rate o®set each other. Like in the real world,
individuals cannot borrow against future old age social security bene¯ts so
¯rst period savings should be equal to or exceed zero (Si ¸ 0).
In the status quo, policy option A, the government pays out the PAYG
bene¯t of level P to all citizens in both periods two and three. The utility
functions for all three periods in the status quo are displayed in the equations
below.
uA
1 = ln((1 ¡ (¿ + µ))(Ii ¡ Si))
uA
2 = ln((1 ¡ ¿)(zi + P))
uA
3 = ln((1 ¡ ¿)(Si ¡ zi + P))
Note that in a deterministic world the lifetime utility maximization prob-
lem can be solved using backward induction; ¯rst maximizing over zi than
over Si. For expositional reasons I will therefore only show the second step
maximization problem over ¯rst period savings in the remainder of this sec-
tion.
One could think of the government's ¯nancial fund running out of money
because of persistently shrinking generations. At ¯rst, the status quo might
be maintained as governments can easily borrow on the credit market. After
2If labor supply is modeled as a function of potential income and the disutility experi-
enced from working and if labor demand is modeled as a function of workers' productivity,
the retirement age should be the same under all three policy options.
6some time though, policy-makers could respond to the ageing of the popu-
lation by adapting the PAYG pension scheme. The government could then
choose one of the following alternative policy options.
² Option B: providing a lower bene¯t. Individuals will receive a bene¯t
of (1 ¡ ¸)P, for 0 < ¸ < 1.
² Option C: only providing bene¯ts in period three. The government
will shift the eligibility age upwards: it will only provide bene¯ts of
the original level P in the third period, but not in the second.
As the government is free to decide upon an alternative PAYG-policy, I
consider savings in a stochastic world. Hence, individuals choose an optimal
savings level (Si) in the ¯rst period under uncertainty over the state of the
world in the second and third period. The government decides on a policy
option after the ¯rst period and this decision is carried out and publicly
known in period two and period three. It seems realistic to assume that
the government will not change any policy rules for those who are already
retired (i.e. between period two and three).
In their ¯rst period maximization problem consumers then maximize
utility over savings taking into account the probabilities they individually
assign to the future occurrence of the di®erent policy options. As each
individual is one of many I assume that each individual can be seen as
a `system-taker' (think of a price-taker). This means that the subjective
probabilities a single individual assigns to di®erent policy options do not
in°uence the actual choice of the government.
P(Option A: Status quo) = ®i
P(Option B: Lower bene¯ts) = ¯i
P(Option C: Later bene¯ts) = ±i
First, I analyze uncertainty about the two possible policy changes sepa-
rately. So, individuals consider only two possible states of the world; One is
the status quo (policy option A) and the other is a signi¯cant policy change,
either lower bene¯ts (B) or later bene¯ts (C). When there is only uncer-
tainty between policy options A and B, the maximization problem can be
found below. Note that I assume that ®i and ¯i add up to one in this case.
max
Si




+2¯i ln((1 ¡ ¿)(
1
2
Si + (1 ¡ ¸)P))
The algebraic solution to this maximization problem can be found in
appendix A and involves many terms which are di±cult to interpret at ¯rst
sight. For clari¯cation, I therefore draw a 3D image of optimal savings with
7the probability an individual assigns to lower bene¯ts (¯i) on the x-axis and
the cut in the bene¯t level (¸) on the z-axis in ¯gure 1. The value of the
bene¯t level, P, is normalized to one here and income is set to twice the
bene¯t level.
The ¯gure presents intuitive results, such that if the cut in bene¯t levels
Figure 1: Optimal savings when there is uncertainty between the status quo
and lower bene¯ts (option B), for di®erent levels of ¯i and ¸.
is negligible (i.e. zero) the probability an individual assigns to policy option
B doesn't a®ect the savings level. Similarly, if someone doesn't assign any
positive value to lower bene¯t levels coming into e®ect, the actual size of
the cut has no in°uence on savings. For any positive level of ¸ however,
savings are increasing in ¯i, the probability one assigns to lower bene¯ts.
Correspondingly, for any positive level of ¯i, savings are increasing in ¸, the
potential cut in bene¯ts.
When there is only uncertainty between policy options A, the status quo,
and C, an increase in the eligibility age, the maximization problem can be
found below. Note that I now assume that the sum of ®i and ±i is equal to
one so that potential changes to the bene¯ts level are ignored.
max
Si;zi








The analytical solution to this problem is somewhat simpler than in the
previous situation and can be found in Appendix A. Figure 2 graphically
represents optimal saving under uncertainty over the status quo and later
bene¯ts, depicting the probability assigned to later bene¯ts, ±i, on the x-
axis. The graph, that has income ¯xed at twice the bene¯t level again, is
very straightforward. The higher the probability individuals assign to a shift
8in the social security eligibility age, the higher are optimal savings.
So, not surprisingly, assigning a positive probability to any ageing-
Figure 2: Optimal savings when there is uncertainty between the status quo
and later bene¯ts (option C), for di®erent levels of ±i.
induced policy change in old age social security should lead to higher savings.
This phenomenon could be called crowding in, the opposite of crowding out
as introduced by Feldstein (1974).
From now on, I will consider the situation in which the status quo is
no longer sustainable. I will hence analyze saving in a world that inhibits
uncertainty over which of the two alternative policy options the government
will choose, lower bene¯ts (option B) or later bene¯ts (option C). I therefore
de¯ne °i here as ±i
¯i+±i, so as the ratio of the later bene¯t expectations over
the sum of the lower and later bene¯ts expectations. Note that this is
necessary in the model as ¯i and ±i can add up to more than one. The
pertaining maximization problem is represented by the equation below.
max
Si;zi
ln((1 ¡ (¿ + µ))(Ii ¡ Si)) + 2(1 ¡ °i)ln((1 ¡ ¿)(
1
2
Si + (1 ¡ ¸)P))




As before, I do not present the algebraic solution (which can be found
in Appendix A), but I present optimal savings graphically in ¯gure 3. This
graph shows °i, the ratio of later bene¯t expectations over the total expec-
tations of any policy change, on the x-axis and ¸, the cut in the bene¯t-level
in case of lower bene¯ts, on the z-axis.
Figure 3 uncovers an interesting pattern. The relationship between
savings and the parameter °i reverses as the bene¯t cut gets larger. For low
cuts (¸ < 0:5), savings increase in °i, as the loss associated with only bene-
¯ts in the third period is larger than the loss associated with lower bene¯ts.
For high cuts however (¸ > 0:5), savings actually increase in °i, as the loss
associated with later bene¯ts is now smaller than the loss associated with
lower bene¯ts.
9Figure 3: Optimal savings when there is uncertainty between lower bene¯ts
(option B) and later bene¯ts (option C), for di®erent levels of °i and ¸i.
I now continue to analyze the situation in which the government will def-
initely change the social security system, so that there is only uncertainty
between policy option B and C. I will argue that the level of private pension
savings also depends on the interaction between °i - which policy change
a person believes is more likely - and her life expectancy. In order to do
so I personalize the parameter for the cut in bene¯t levels (¸i) to represent
di®erences in the relative individual loss associated with lower (option B)
or later (option C) bene¯ts. The idea is that in real-life di®erent survival
probabilities render the loss associated with lower and later bene¯ts di®erent
across individuals. For example, someone who is certain to die between the
age of 65 and 67 is likely to associate a larger loss to a two year increase in
the old age bene¯ts eligibility age than to a ten percent cut in the bene¯ts
level. Someone who is certain to die between the age of 95 and 100 will
instead be more concerned with a ten percent bene¯t level cut.
To illustrate this further ¯gure 4 depicts optimal savings for two groups
of individuals: the `long-lived' and the `short-lived'. Up to now I have as-
sumed that everybody survives up until the end of the third period. This
will still hold for the long-lived individuals, but a new group of people is
introduced who know themselves that they will die by the end of the sec-
ond period. I assume that the government has no way of di®erentiating
between people in terms of the social security bene¯t. The long-lived group
will therefore receive later bene¯ts with probability °i, while the short-lived
group will receive no bene¯t at all with the same probability. Both groups
will receive a bene¯t of level (1 ¡ ¸i) ¤ P with the probability (1 ¡ °i). The
algebraic optimal savings for the short lived can be found in the appendix.
For simplicity, ¯gure 4 includes results for a ¸ equal to 0.40, which corre-
sponds roughly to a real-life cut in bene¯t levels of ten percent relative to a
two-year increase in the eligibility age.
10Figure 4: Long-lived and short-lived individuals: Optimal savings when
there is uncertainty between lower bene¯ts and later bene¯ts for di®erent
levels of °i (¸ = 0:4).
Figure 4 shows that savings for the short-lived are much more sensitive
to their subjective expectation °i, representing the relative likelihood of an
increase in the social security eligibility age over a decrease in bene¯t levels.
It can be shown that this di®erence is larger for higher levels of the bene¯t
cut, ¸.
In the empirical analysis I will hence have three strong hypotheses to test:
a) Private savings, and hence participation in a private pension scheme, are
increasing in the subjective probability individuals assign to lower bene¯ts,
¯i. b) Private savings, and participation in a private pension scheme, are
also increasing in the subjective probability individuals assign to an increase
in the eligibility age, ±i. c) Private savings, and thus participation in a pri-
vate pension scheme, are increasing in the relative `fear' for later bene¯ts
(over the sum of lower and later bene¯ts) for short-lived individuals, that
assign themselves a relatively low survival probability. To test these three
hypotheses separately, I will test the three theoretical uncertainty models
separately in Section 4 of this paper . The model in which there is uncer-
tainty between lower and later bene¯ts will be estimated given the sum of
uncertainty about abandoning the status quo. An additional set of models
will be estimated including interactions between the expectation parameters
and the subjective probabilities individuals assign to their own survival.
3 Empirical strategy and data
3.1 Empirical strategy
The relationship between policy change expectations and pension fund par-
ticipation will be tested in a reduced form. Eight linear single regression
models are estimated of voluntary participation in a pension scheme. These
models all include one or multiple of the expectation parameters ¯i, the
probability that bene¯ts will be lowered, ±i, the probability that the social
11security eligibility age will increase and °i, the ratio of ±i over the sum of
¯i and ±i. The dependent variable, participation in a voluntary pension
scheme, is discrete and therefore I am estimating standard probits. Error
terms are clustered at the individual level. The ¯rst four estimated models,
1a to 4a, can be found in the equations below. The last four estimated
models, 1b to 4b, are identical to their respective a-versions but moreover
include interactions of the expectations with a dummy for being subjectively
short-lived.
y¤
i = ³¯1 ¤ ¯i + x0
i³ + ²i (1a)
y¤
i = ³±1 ¤ ±i + x0
i³ + ²i (2a)
y¤
i = ³°1 ¤ °i + ³sum ¤ (¯i + ±i) + x0
i³ + ²i (3a)
y¤
i = ³¯1 ¤ ¯i + ³°1 ¤ °i + x0
i³ + ²i (4a)
The identi¯cation of the expectation coe±cients (the ³¯'s, ³±'s and ³°'s)
comes from the heterogeneity in expectations among individuals. In order
to be able to apply this identi¯cation strategy I have to make an assump-
tion about what process generates this heterogeneity. This is not a-priori
clear since the event respondents are evaluating is the exact same for all
and hence one could expect similar probability answers for all respondents.
A natural explanation for the dispersion in answers is that individuals ex-
hibit di®erent information search intensities and apply di®erent information
processing technologies. If this is the case, my identi¯cation strategy is jus-
ti¯ed, providing that I am willing to assume that in the savings regressions
the political information handling characteristics do not play a role in the
error term. Said di®erently, I can apply this strategy if I believe that apart
from the policy change expectations and the various demographic controls,
the political information handling characteristics don't seriously in°uence
pension scheme participation. One could however also argue that di®er-
ences in general pessimism drive the dispersion in expectations. Although I
cannot rule out that some of the heterogeneity involves general pessimism,
I don't believe this captures all variation. My argument is that if pessimism
was driving everything, I shouldn't ¯nd any results in the empirical mod-
els including the ratio of di®erent policy change expectations. Pessimism
should after all a®ect the two policy expectations similarly. Nevertheless,
I do ¯nd signi¯cant results for the ³°-coe±cient in tables 2 and 3. In this
paper I will therefore conclude that the heterogeneity in policy expecta-
tions re°ects di®erences in information search intensities and information
processing technologies. I furthermore assume that these information han-
dling characteristics don't play a separate major role in the pension scheme
participation decision.
123.2 Data
For the empirical analysis I use data from the Dutch Central Bank House-
holds Savings Survey (DHS), waves 2003 up to 20073 combined with data
from the Dutch Pensionbarometer, waves May 2006 up to May 2008. These
datasets are both collected by Tilburg University's CentERdata; the ¯rst in
cooperation with the Dutch Central Bank and the latter in cooperation with
Netspar, a Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement. Both
datasets are enumerated through the same Internet panel. Much is done to
prevent selection e®ects. The respondents are randomly selected from the
general municipalities' administration and when a chosen individual does not
have access to the Internet, access is provided. The surveys enumerate partly
overlapping subsets of a large pool of respondents so that the datasets could
be merged on the identi¯cation number of individuals. The information
about pension scheme participation and all independent variables except for
the expectations are taken from the Dutch Central Bank Households Savings
Survey. This survey is designed to shed more light on (the reasoning behind)
savings decisions and enumerates approximately 3000 households each year.
The subjective expectations were taken from the Pensionbarometer which
is collected mainly to produce longitudinal statistics for con¯dence levels in
the Dutch pension system. Every month on average 500 respondents re-
ceive the digital questionnaire although every respondent only receives the
questions once every three months. This batch system was introduced to
be able to produce the con¯dence statistics regularly, but not to overwhelm
the respondents with questions. In this paper, I use the ¯rst twenty-four
waves of the Pensionbarometer of which the last was enumerated in April
2008. A total of 2,554 individuals were interviewed. I limit my sample to
those individuals between the ages of 30 and 59 who are participating in a
mandatory occupational pension scheme and who have participated in the
Pensionbarometer more than once. As a result of the merge and my selec-
tion, my sample consists of 3,228 observations and 1,114 individuals.
The dependent variable in my analysis is a dummy on voluntary pension
scheme participation. The information for this variable is taken from several
binary questions in the DHS that ask about voluntary pension scheme con-
tributions each year. An example of such a question is \Did you contribute
to a `lijfrente' pension scheme?". Although there is no speci¯c time horizon
mentioned in this question, respondents seem to interpret it as relating to a
¯nite time period such as a year. Evidence for this is found in the transition
probabilities from one survey to the next: nineteen percent of my sample
switch from having contributed to a `lijfrente' to not having contributed
whereas this would be impossible if respondents would interpret the ques-
3Earlier years of the DHS are available but not included as no subjective survival
probabilities were administered before 2003.
13Table 1: Percentage of full sample participating in voluntary pension asset
types (N=3,228)
Asset type 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
3rd pillar - `lijfrente' 31% 33% 32% 30% 26%
3rd pillar - `koopsom' 9% 11% 12% 10% 10%
2nd pillar - extra entitlements 1% 2% 1% 2% 1%
2nd pillar - extra payments 2% 2% 1% 1% 1%
One of the above 38% 42% 42% 38% 35 %
N 500 617 697 695 719
tion as ever having contributed. The dummy in the regressions summarizes
whether someone contributed to one designated third pillar pension accounts
and/or whether someone voluntary contributed more than they were obliged
to to their occupational pension fund. I have taken this variable as the most
indicative of one's intention to save voluntarily for old age. As could be al-
ready understood from the introduction, most Dutch employees are obliged
to participate in occupational pension schemes and total pension wealth is
therefore not necessarily a re°ection of individual savings decisions. Unfor-
tunately, I do not have detailed information on the level of contributions
made into the voluntary (nor the mandatory) pension schemes each year.
Table 1 presents the number of respondents in my sample participating
in any of these asset schemes per survey year. The variable in the bottom
row, whether an individual owns any of the asset types above, is used in
the regressions. The most popular voluntary pension savings product is
a so-called `lijfrente-polis', a private pension product that requires regular
contributions. The second most popular pension product is the `koopsom-
polis', a private savings account that is like the `lijfrente-polis' to a certain
degree tax-exempt, but that requires a lump-sum contribution. Overall,
about forty percent of my sample owns at least one type of designated vol-
untary pension assets. Older individuals (46 %) and richer individuals (49
%) contribute more often to pension schemes , but young individuals (32
%) and low income individuals (27 %) still contribute to a relatively large
extent.
The most important independent variables in my analysis are those that
represent the policy change expectations, ¯i and ±i. The variables are based
on subjective probability answers taken from the Pensionbarometer collected
by Tilburg University's CentERdata. Every three months respondents are
faced with the following two questions; \What probability (between 0.0
and 1.0) do you assign to at least ten percent lower real AOW-bene¯ts
within twenty years" and \What probability (between 0.0 and 1.0) do you
assign to an at least two year higher AOW-eligibility age within twenty
14years". As it is unlikely that consumers will change their pension plans
every three months according to their updated social security beliefs, I am
interested in a relatively stable measure of policy expectations. Therefore
I use the individual means of the assigned probabilities over the observed
24 monthly waves as my measures for ¯i and ±i. Note that this implies
that ¯i, ±i and °i are time-invariant in my dataset. In order to be able
to merge the expectations variables (surveyed in 2006-2008) to the pension
scheme information (surveyed in 2003-2007) I moreover have to make the
assumption that individuals' relative expectations have remained stable over
time. Given that in the period 2003 to 2008 the Dutch old age social security
system didn't change in any way, I conclude that the assumption about a
stable distribution of expectations over these six years is plausible.
Histograms of the ¯i (lower bene¯ts probability) and ±i (later bene¯ts
probability) variables are found in ¯gure 5 and ¯gure 6 respectively. It can
be seen that the mode of ¯i is lower than that of ±i, suggesting that in general
individuals believe that an increase in the eligibility age is the most likely
policy change. This is con¯rmed when checking the average expectations
(0.42 with s.d. .24 and 0.53 with s.d. .24).
Figure 7 displays a histogram of °i, the ratio of the estimates of ±i (later
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bene¯ts probability) over the sum of ¯i (lower bene¯ts probability) and ±i.
About 34% of individuals assign an equal probability to both policy changes,
but the majority of individuals believes one of the two is more likely to occur
with a larger group considering the eligibility age increase more likely. The
correlation-coe±cient of ¯i and ±i actually is equal to 0.5.
Another important independent variable in the empirical analysis is the
respondent's life expectancy, proxied by a dummy on whether someone is
subjectively short-lived. This variable is constructed from of a question
posed in the Dutch Central Bank Household Savings Survey that asks \What
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is the probability - between 1 and 10, that you will survive up until the age
of 75?". A histogram of answers to this question can be found in the ap-
pendix (¯gure A-1). The unconditional mean of and median of the survival
probability are equal to seven, the mode is equal to eight. In order to con-
struct the short-lived dummy I ¯rst calculate average probabilities per age
and gender group. A graph of these average probabilities can be seen in the
appendix (graph A-2). The short-lived dummy is then equal to one if an
individual reports a lower probability than the average of his or her appro-
priate birth year and gender group. A binary variable was chosen to render
the estimation results easy to interpret. This means that 39% of my sample
is classi¯ed as short-lived. Other controls in the pension fund participation
regressions include log gross income, education level, age, a partner dummy,
a child dummy and year dummies. Descriptive statistics for six di®erent
sub-samples can be found in the appendix (tables A-1 and A-2).
16Figure 7: Histogram of °i (the ratio of the estimates of ¯i (lower bene¯ts
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4 Empirical results
This section discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Table 2 displays
the relevant coe±cients of all eight probit regressions of participation in a
voluntary pension scheme. The appendix contains a table of standard errors
(table A-3). The Akaike's information criteria of these models can be found
in table 4. All eight models are estimated on four di®erent samples; the total
sample (column I), the young sample - those between 30 and 39 (column
II), a middle aged sample - those between 40 and 49 (column III) and a
relatively old sample - those between 50 and 59 (column IV). This was done
as there is reason to believe that the degree to which individuals prepare
for a policy change in old age social security is di®erent across ages. One
could for example argue that the larger the number of years to retirement,
the weaker the incentive is to act upon current policy change expectations.
Table 2 certainly con¯rms this notion. Later on in this section the same
exercise will be done for three di®erent income groups.
The coe±cients for the ¯rst three models in the ¯rst column estimated
on the entire sample, in which one type of uncertainty is investigated at a
time, illustrate that individuals who assign high policy change probabilities
participate more in voluntary pension schemes. This is in accordance with
the ¯rst two hypotheses of Section 2. It seems that the second model in
which there is only policy uncertainty between the status quo and an in-
crease in the social security eligibility age explains most variation in the
data. This conclusion can however not be drawn for all age groups. The
young react most to their relative `fear' for a higher eligibility age (°i), the
middle age category reacts very strongly to their higher eligibility age ex-
17Table 2: Coe±cients of probit models. Dependent: participation in volun-
tary pension scheme. Low age: 30-39 years, Middle age: 40-49 years, High
age: 50-59 years. Interactions are with the short-lived dummy.
Model Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV)
All Low age Middle age High age
1a Beta 0.241 -0.075 0.301 0.446
2a Delta 0.507** 0.104 1.139*** 0.443
3a Gamma 0.078 0.263 0.809* -0.319
Sum 0.269** 0.022 0.572*** 0.307*
1b Beta 0.481* -0.171 0.688* 0.782*
Interaction -0.619* 0.248 -0.992* -0.895*
Short-lived 0.090 -0.27 0.247 0.203
2b Delta 0.339 -0.042 1.213*** 0.127
Interaction 0.454 0.402 -0.193 0.875*
Short-lived -0.414* -0.386 -0.043 -0.610*
3b Gamma -0.315 0.150 0.572 -0.952*
Interaction 1.067* 0.343 0.611 1.694**
Sum 0.265** 0.021 0.573*** 0.285
Short-lived -0.778** -0.35 -0.499 -1.132**
4a Beta 0.033 -0.162 -0.148 0.306
Delta 0.464** 0.183 1.200*** 0.329
4b Beta 0.411 -0.196 0.256 0.866**
Interaction -1.013*** 0.066 -1.040* -1.600**
Delta 0.168 0.049 1.107** -0.204
Interaction 0.899** 0.381 0.223 1.527**
Short-lived -0.221 -0.398 0.179 -0.313
N 3228 931 1097 1198
Ind 1114 414 422 439
¤ p < 0:05,
¤¤ p < 0:01,
¤¤¤ p < 0:001
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (table A-3)
All regressions include the short-lived dummy, a constant, log income, education level,
age, a child dummy, a partner dummy and year dummies.
18pectations (±i), whereas the oldest age group responds most to their lower
bene¯t level expectations (¯i). The middle age category apparently drives
the e®ects in the overall sample as this group displays the strongest reac-
tion to its policy change expectations. The young on the other hand don't
signi¯cantly prepare for the anticipated policy changes.
The models ¯ve, six and seven furthermore include an interaction term
between the expectations variables and a dummy for being subjectively
short-lived (see Section 3 for an explanation of this dummy). In model
¯ve, where only uncertainty in the level of bene¯ts is considered, the in-
teraction e®ect in the total sample is signi¯cant and negative, undoing the
positive e®ect of the change probability for the short-lived. Only individ-
uals who believe they have a good chance of being around at age 75 thus
prepare for a possible decrease in social security levels. This e®ect is clear
for those older than 39, but is not present for younger individuals. In model
six, where only uncertainty in the eligibility age is considered, the interac-
tion e®ect in the entire sample is positive, so that short-lived individuals
react more to their eligibility age expectations. The coe±cient is however
not signi¯cant as the interaction has an opposite sign for the middle-aged
group. Short-lived individuals between 50 and 59 do signi¯cantly let their
voluntary pension scheme contribution depend on their ±i. Focusing on the
total sample coe±cients in the seventh model, the interaction between being
short-lived and the relative `fear' for an eligibility age increase is large, pos-
itive and signi¯cant, exactly as my theoretical model predicts. In the model
I explain that the expected cost of a higher eligibility age is relatively larger
than the cost of lower bene¯ts for individuals that expect to live shorter
than others. The empirical e®ect is clearly driven by the oldest age group,
probably because the subjective survival probabilities for this group contain
most information.
In model four, both policy change expectations are included without the
interactions, which takes away some of the e®ect of lower bene¯t expecta-
tions. However, pension scheme participation is still signi¯cantly a®ected
by the probability that the social security eligibility age will go up. Also
in this model, the middle age group reacts most distinctly and those under
forty hardly react at all. In model eight, both policy change expectations are
included as well as the interactions, and the results from models ¯ve, six and
seven are replicated. The two interactions are both highly signi¯cant in the
total sample model. Conditioning on the later bene¯t expectations, short-
lived individuals that assign a high probability to lower bene¯ts participate
less in pension schemes. Conditioning on the lower bene¯t expectations,
short-lived individuals participate more in pension schemes when they be-
lieve a higher eligibility age is likely. When considering the results for the
young sample only, it becomes clear that individuals between 30 and 39 don't
really prepare for a policy change. Retirement is apparently too far away
for this group to take current policy change expectations into account when
19purchasing pension products. The older two age categories do signi¯cantly
prepare for policy changes and the interaction e®ects of being short-lived
are most important for the oldest group.
Age is not the only demographic characteristic that is used to divide the
sample to estimate the eight models separately. In the last three columns
of table 3 the sample is split in three equal income categories to investigate
how di®erent income groups react to policy change expectations. There
is reason to believe that responses will be di®erent because the Dutch old
age social security bene¯t levels are equal for all (see Section 1.3) so that
concavity of the utility function could lead to a smaller response to policy
change expectations for richer individuals. Column V displays results for
low income-individuals - those who earn less than EUR 25,150 a year -, col-
umn VI shows coe±cients for middle-income individuals - those with a gross
yearly income between EUR 25,150 and EUR 38,100 - and the estimates in
column VII use information of high income individuals - those with a gross
yearly income over EUR 38,100. The appendix contains a table of standard
errors (table A-4) associated to the displayed coe±cients. The Akaike's in-
formation criteria of these models can be found in table 4. It turns out that
responses indeed vary. Broadly speaking, rich individuals indeed do not care
so much about upcoming policy changes. The level of social security bene¯ts
relative to their own income probably doesn't justify any additional action
if old age bene¯ts might be a®ected. Middle-income individuals respond
much more to their policy change expectations. In particular, the eligibility
age expectations explain a substantial degree of pension scheme participa-
tion. Moreover, the coe±cients of the expectation interaction terms with the
short-lived dummy are more signi¯cant for those individuals who happen to
belong to the middle-income group. Perhaps this group better realizes how
the two policy options have di®erent e®ects on short- and long-lived indi-
viduals. Individuals in the low-income group also seem to participate more
in voluntary pension schemes when they feel that policy changes are likely.
This group is especially worried about the level of pension bene¯ts as the
AOW-bene¯ts constitute a very large part of their expected pension income.
The interactions with the short-lived dummy are less important.
Table 4 provides insights into the ¯t of the di®erent models for all seven
(sub)samples by displaying Akaike's information criteria. The criteria can
only be compared within each separate (sub)sample. For the entire sample
(column I) model number eight, including both the bene¯t level (¯i) and
eligibility age (±i) expectations as well as the interactions with a short-lived
dummy, is preferred. This is also the case for the middle age, high age, low
income and middle-income sub-samples. For the two sub-categories that
didn't display signi¯cant reactions in pension scheme participation accord-
ing to their policy expectations, the low age and high income groups, this is
not the case. Model two is preferred when only analyzing young individuals
and model seven is preferred when only analyzing the rich, although the
20di®erences in the Akaike's criteria for these two groups are small.
Overall, the three hypotheses posed in Section 2 can thus not be re-
jected by the regression results in tables 2 and 3. Participation in voluntary
pension schemes is higher for those who assign a high probability to any fu-
ture change in the PAYG pension scheme. People's expectations regarding a
shift in the eligibility age are particularly important. Moreover, conditional
on the sum of change expectations, individuals who believe they don't have
a long life and who also believe that an increase in the eligibility age is more
likely than a decrease in the bene¯t level, participate more. This can be
explained by the fact that the cost of an eligibility age increase will be rel-
atively larger to them. These e®ects are however not equal for all age and
income categories, which can be explained by di®erent time horizons, vari-
ation in the relative ¯nancial importance of AOW-bene¯ts and di®erences
in the informational value of subjective survival probabilities. The young
and those with a relatively high income don't seem to prepare much for a
policy change, regardless of how likely they believe such a change will be.
The middle-aged and those in the middle-income category seem particularly
concerned with an increase in the social security eligibility age, whereas the
low-income group responds to a greater extent to their bene¯t level expec-
tations. The di®erent e®ects for long- and short-lived individuals are most
pronounced in the oldest group and in the middle-income group.
21Table 3: Coe±cients of probit models. Dependent: participation in volun-
tary pension scheme. Low income: lower than EUR 25,150, Middle income:
EUR 25,150-EUR 38,100, High income: more than EUR 38,100. Interac-
tions are with the short-lived dummy.
Model Variable (I) (V) (VI) (VII)
All Low income Middle income High income
1a Beta 0.241 0.712** 0.333 -0.445
2a Delta 0.507** 0.640* 0.767** 0.136
3a Gamma 0.078 -0.201 0.304 0.268
Sum 0.269** 0.458** 0.401* -0.092
1b Beta 0.481* 1.010** 0.629* -0.250
Interaction -0.619* -0.750 -0.724 -0.548
Short-lived 0.090 0.209 0.218 -0.095
2b Delta 0.339 0.448 0.491 0.109
Interaction 0.454 0.510 0.710 0.081
Short-lived -0.414* -0.399 -0.475 -0.371
3b Gamma -0.315 -0.860* -0.314 0.123
Interaction 1.067* -0.630 1.474* 0.419
Sum 0.265** 1.286 0.380* -0.090
Short-lived -0.778** -0.860* -0.923* -0.558
4a Beta 0.033 0.544 0.010 -0.590*
Delta 0.464** 0.398 0.762** 0.357
4b Beta 0.411 1.022** 0.518 -0.347
Interaction -1.013*** -1.168* -1.419** -0.689
Delta 0.168 -0.029 0.279 0.237
Interaction 0.899** 1.048* 1.404** 0.353
Short-lived -0.221 -0.195 -0.238 -0.21
N 3228 1076 1076 1076
Ind 1114 495 481 421
¤ p < 0:05,
¤¤ p < 0:01,
¤¤¤ p < 0:001
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level (table A-4)
All regressions include the short-lived dummy, a constant, log income, education level,
age, a child dummy, a partner dummy and year dummies.
22Table 4: Akaike Information Criteria per model and sample
Model Akaike Information Criterion
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
All Low age Mid age Hi Age Low inc Mid inc Hi inc
1 4144.8 1127.1 1400.3 1608.2 1212.3 1434.4 1463.7
2 4123.0 1127.0 1362.7 1607.2 1216.5 1417.7 1469.4
3 4131.3 1128.5 1372.5 1603.4 1209.7 1423.8 1469.8
5 4136.9 1128.7 1394.1 1602.0 1209.5 1431.7 1463.4
6 4119.7 1128.0 1364.4 1600.7 1216.4 1415.5 1471.4
7 4119.5 1130.2 1373.1 1589.6 1206.3 1416.8 1471.1
4 4124.9 1128.4 1364.1 1605.9 1210.1 1419.7 1461.9
8 4102.4 1131.4 1360.4 1580.8 1202.5 1405.6 1462.9
N 3228 931 1097 1198 1076 1076 1076
5 Conclusion
From the 1960s and 1970s onwards economists have been anxious to know
whether private savings in industrialized countries had been crowded out by
the installment of old age social security systems in the decades before. The
future of Pay-As-You-Go pension schemes seemed prosperous at the time
and most studies took \continually rising bene¯t levels (Feldstein, 1974, p.
911)" into account. During the last two decades however, both economists
and policy-makers have realized that Western populations are ageing and
that this has consequences for the ¯nancial sustainability of old age social
security systems. Governments in many OECD-countries are now contem-
plating how to change their public pension schemes so that these can last
into the (aged) future. Wherever PAYG- pension schemes are still unal-
tered there thus exists signi¯cant uncertainty about future pension policies.
Therefore, it is now relevant to investigate how individuals adapt their pri-
vate savings to a possible dismantlement of public pension provisions. This
does not only shed light on the relationship between public and private sav-
ings, but in addition tells us more about how citizens respond to anticipated
policy changes.
In this paper I present empirical evidence from The Netherlands, ana-
lyzing how subjective probabilities assigned to two di®erent policy changes
a®ect participation in voluntary pension schemes. The empirical evidence
(see tables 2 and 3 in Section 4) shows that individuals contribute to a vol-
untary pension scheme more often when they are more pessimistic about
the future of old age social security. This increased participation is most
pronounced for individuals who assign a higher probability to a potential
increase in the eligibility age, but a small positive e®ect of the subjective
probability assigned to a decrease in bene¯t levels is also found. These re-
23sults are in accordance with the ¯rst two theoretical hypotheses formulated
in Section 2. Which of these policy options an individual believes is more
likely to occur also matters. Taking the sum of policy change expectations
into account, those who believe that an increase in the eligibility age is more
likely than a decrease in the bene¯t level participate slightly more. This ef-
fect is however much stronger for those who assign themselves a low survival
probability. The third hypothesis from Section 2 is thereby con¯rmed. My
theoretical model explains this through the relative larger cost the short-
lived group associates with an eligibility age increase. All of this suggests
that individuals indeed prepare for potential policy changes and that policy
uncertainty in social security leads to an increase or `crowding in' of private
savings.
Overall, the theoretical predictions from Section 2 are thus con¯rmed by
the regression results in tables 2 and 3. The e®ects are however not equal
for all age and income categories. The young and those with a relatively
high income don't seem to prepare much for a policy change, regardless of
how likely they believe such a change will be. Retirement is perhaps too far
away for those between 30 and 39 to take current policy expectations into
account in their savings decisions. Rich individuals on the other hand prob-
ably don't care about the future of public pension bene¯ts as these bene¯ts
only amount to a small fraction of their anticipated pension income. The
middle-aged and those in the middle-income category do respond strongly
to their policy change expectations. They seem particularly concerned with
an increase in the social security eligibility age, whereas the low-income
group responds to a greater extent to their bene¯t level expectations. The
latter makes sense as social security bene¯ts are by far the largest part of
anticipated pension income for this group. The di®erent e®ects for short-
and long-lived individuals are most pronounced in the oldest group and in
the middle-income group. Apparently, these groups are better aware of the
di®erential impact of later and lower bene¯ts on di®erent survival groups.
Policy-makers and politicians can learn two things from the above re-
sults. First, as people's policy expectations matter for their savings be-
havior, these expectations should be managed with care to the extent that
this is possible. The public debate on the future sustainability of old age
social security supposedly in°uences policy expectations and therefore con-
cern should only be raised if this is somehow justi¯ed. Second, the results
suggest that wealth e®ects of policy changes in old age social security will
partly be o®set by individuals' private pension savings. This ¯nding en-
courages governments to actually carry out necessary changes to the PAYG
pension-system if these are generally expected anyhow.
Although my empirical results are suggestive, the case for a crowding in
e®ect would be stronger if the same results would be replicated using data on
the actual level of voluntary contributions. Evidence from other countries
about the e®ect of the (potential) degeneration of the PAYG-pension scheme
24on private savings is also essential to draw de¯nitive conclusions about the
crowding in of savings by policy uncertainty in ¯rst pillar pensions.
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A Algebraic results
This appendix displays optimal savings equations resulting from the model
described in Section 2.
The following savings level is optimal when the government chooses be-
tween the status quo (A) with probability (1 ¡ ¯i) and lower bene¯ts (B)






(¡8P + 2Ii + 6P¸ ¡ 4P¯i¸+
p
((¡8P + 2Ii + 6P¸ ¡ 4P¯i¸)2+
12(¡4P2 + 4PIi + 4P2¸ ¡ 4PIi¸ + 4PIi¯i¸)))
Normalizing the bene¯t level P to be equal to one and income to be equal
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p
(¡4 + 6¸ ¡ 4¯i¸)2 + 12(4 ¡ 4¸ + 8¯i¸))
The savings below are optimal when the government chooses between the
status quo with probability (1 ¡ ±i) and an increase in the eligibility age






(¡5P ¡ 2±iP + 2I+
q
P2 + 20±iP2 + 4±2
i P2 + 4PIi + 16±iPIi + 4I2
i )
26Normalizing the bene¯t level P to be equal to one and income to be equal
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The following equation displays optimal savings when there will certainly be
a policy change but it is uncertain which option the government will choose,
either lower bene¯ts with probability (1¡°i) or an increase in the eligibility
age with probability °i = ±i
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Normalizing the bene¯t level P to be equal to one and income to be equal
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(1)
The equation for optimal savings of short-lived individuals (those that
know they will die after the second period) when there is uncertainty be-
tween policy option B (lower bene¯ts) and policy option C (later bene¯ts)
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Normalizing the bene¯t level P to be equal to one and income to be equal
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Figure A-2: Lowess smoothing graph of average survival probabilities up to
































































30 40 50 60
Age
Male respondents Female respondents
28C Summary statistics
Table A-1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables in
the estimations for di®erent age groups.
Variable (II) (III) (IV)
Low age Middle age High age
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Dummy pension participation 0.321 0.467 0.365 0.482 0.463 0.499
Prob. of lower bene¯ts (¯i) 0.442 0.230 0.426 0.238 0.395 0.247
Prob. of later bene¯ts (±i) 0.539 0.227 0.531 0.230 0.529 0.261
Ratio later over lower (°i) 0.557 0.144 0.567 0.163 0.580 0.185
Sum of change expectations 0.981 0.395 0.957 0.392 0.924 0.428
Dummy for short-lived 0.408 0.492 0.388 0.488 0.384 0.487
Log of gross income 9.904 1.843 9.742 2.346 9.934 2.149
Age 34.290 2.821 44.813 2.814 54.325 2.827
Dummy for female 0.437 0.496 0.428 0.495 0.356 0.479
Dataset 2003 0.148 0.356 0.160 0.367 0.155 0.362
Dataset 2004 0.189 0.392 0.203 0.403 0.182 0.386
Dataset 2005 0.218 0.413 0.215 0.411 0.215 0.411
Dataset 2006 0.205 0.404 0.213 0.410 0.225 0.418
Dataset 2007 Omitted category
Primary education Omitted category
Secondary education 0.226 0.418 0.342 0.475 0.421 0.494
Vocational education 0.293 0.455 0.248 0.432 0.163 0.370
Tertiary education 0.456 0.498 0.377 0.485 0.383 0.486
Other education 0.021 0.145 0.010 0.100 0.002 0.041
Dummy for child 0.534 0.499 0.603 0.490 0.358 0.480
Dummy for partner 0.716 0.451 0.754 0.431 0.762 0.426
Observations 931 1097 1198
29Table A-2: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables in
the estimations for di®erent income groups.
Variable (V) (VI) (VII)
Low income Middle income High income
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Dummy pension participation 0.267 0.442 0.407 0.492 0.493 0.500
Prob. of lower bene¯ts (¯i) 0.421 0.253 0.430 0.241 0.405 0.224
Prob. of later bene¯ts (±i) 0.538 0.249 0.549 0.239 0.511 0.233
Ratio later over lower (°i) 0.573 0.168 0.569 0.168 0.564 0.165
Sum of change expectations 0.959 0.429 0.979 0.407 0.917 0.381
Dummy for short-lived 0.415 0.493 0.389 0.488 0.373 0.484
Log of gross income 8.377 3.198 10.367 0.108 10.836 0.265
Age 44.849 8.650 44.612 8.701 46.482 8.211
Dummy for female 0.724 0.447 0.335 0.472 0.152 0.360
Dataset 2003 0.164 0.370 0.147 0.354 0.154 0.361
Dataset 2004 0.192 0.394 0.185 0.388 0.196 0.397
Dataset 2005 0.213 0.409 0.225 0.418 0.210 0.408
Dataset 2006 0.207 0.406 0.237 0.425 0.202 0.401
Dataset 2007 Omitted category
Primary education Omitted category
Secondary education 0.442 0.497 0.356 0.479 0.215 0.411
Vocational education 0.295 0.456 0.246 0.431 0.148 0.355
Tertiary education 0.209 0.407 0.370 0.483 0.627 0.484
Other education 0.010 0.101 0.019 0.135 0.002 0.043
Dummy for child 0.562 0.496 0.436 0.496 0.478 0.500
Dummy for partner 0.798 0.401 0.675 0.469 0.765 0.424
Observations 1076 1076 1076
30Table A-3: Standard errors of probit models. Dependent: participation in
voluntary pension scheme.
Model Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV)
All Low age Middle age High age
1a Beta 0.159 0.268 0.269 0.260
2a Delta 0.163 0.281 0.286 0.246
3a Gamma 0.238 0.448 0.410 0.345
Sum 0.097 0.164 0.170 0.150
1b Beta 0.191 0.349 0.327 0.314
Interaction 0.268 0.462 0.450 0.448
Short-lived 0.132 0.223 0.228 0.205
2b Delta 0.191 0.351 0.343 0.285
Interaction 0.289 0.470 0.528 0.446
Short-lived 0.172 0.277 0.312 0.26
3b Gamma 0.267 0.543 0.470 0.390
Interaction 0.422 0.740 0.749 0.650
Sum 0.098 0.164 0.170 0.153
Short-lived 0.252 0.435 0.449 0.393
4a Beta 0.176 0.301 0.295 0.286
Delta 0.179 0.316 0.312 0.270
4b Beta 0.210 0.390 0.360 0.336
Interaction 0.305 0.530 0.524 0.497
Delta 0.209 0.395 0.373 0.304
Interaction 0.323 0.539 0.598 0.483
Short-lived 0.177 0.291 0.32 0.268
N 3228 931 1097 1198
31Table A-4: Standard errors of probit models. Dependent: participation in
voluntary pension scheme.
Model Variable (I) (V) (VI) (VII)
All Low income Middle income High income
1a Beta 0.159 0.249 0.259 0.272
2a Delta 0.163 0.251 0.256 0.276
3a Gamma 0.238 0.410 0.396 0.383
Sum 0.097 0.144 0.158 0.169
1b Beta 0.191 0.309 0.308 0.326
Interaction 0.268 0.418 0.436 0.484
Short-lived 0.132 0.216 0.224 0.22
2b Delta 0.191 0.299 0.300 0.314
Interaction 0.289 0.419 0.461 0.522
Short-lived 0.172 0.257 0.283 0.296
3b Gamma 0.267 0.449 0.441 0.436
Interaction 0.422 0.707 0.733 0.711
Sum 0.098 0.144 0.161 0.170
Short-lived 0.252 0.42 0.429 0.43
4a Beta 0.176 0.290 0.290 0.287
Delta 0.179 0.293 0.282 0.294
4b Beta 0.210 0.359 0.339 0.344
Interaction 0.305 0.506 0.521 0.519
Delta 0.209 0.344 0.328 0.333
Interaction 0.323 0.513 0.530 0.558
Short-lived 0.177 0.254 0.294 0.311
N 3228 1076 1076 1076
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